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From Public-Private Partnership to Market. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
as a New Form of Governance in Climate Protection
Gudrun Benecke/Lars Friberg/Markus Lederer/Miriam Schröder
Abstract
Tackling climate change is by now recognised as a policy challenge of utmost importance. The 
Kyoto Protocol is the most advanced multilateral effort to tackle climate change. One of the 
most interesting and innovative building blocks of the Kyoto Protocol climate regime is the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Since its inception this so-called flexible mechanism 
has been key in establishing a volatile and booming market for carbon emission reductions 
(CERs), which are the first internationally traded commodity created by an international en-
vironmental agreement. Within the process of market establishment and function, private 
actors such as companies, project verifiers, carbon funds and traders have become leading 
actors in the global carbon market. The market continues to be intimately policy dependent as 
demand derives from the stringency of emission allocations and future nation state commit-
ments for greenhouse gas reductions. This article investigates the transformation of a market 
that has been initiated by public actors, kick-started by public-private partnerships (PPPs) and 
that has evolved into a market in which governments are withdrawing and private actors are 
increasingly taking up their governance function. It furthermore evaluates the status quo of 
the CDM and finishes with open questions for research.
Zusammenfassung
Die Bewältigung des Klimawandels ist heute eine der bedeutendsten politischen Heraus-
forderungen. Das Kyoto-Protokoll ist der am weitesten fortgeschrittene Prozess der inter-
nationalen Staatengemeinschaft im Hinblick auf die Herausforderungen des Klimawandels. 
Einer der interessantesten und innovativsten Bausteine des Kyoto-Protokolls ist der Clean 
Development Mechanismus (CDM). Seit seiner Initiierung ist dieser so genannte flexible Me-
chanismus der Schlüssel zur Schaffung von volatilen und boomenden Märkten für Zertifi-
kate für die Reduktion von Kohlenstoffemissionen (CERs). Diese Zertifikate, kurz CERs, sind 
die ersten international gehandelten Güter, die durch ein internationales Umweltabkommen 
geschaffen wurden. Während des Prozesses der Marktetablierung sind private Akteure wie 
Firmen, Projektverifizierer, Carbon Funds und Zertifikatshändler zu den führenden Akteuren 
des globalen Kohlenstoffmarktes aufgestiegen. Dennoch ist der Markt weiterhin stark von 
den politischen Rahmenbedingungen abhängig. Die Nachfrage wird durch die Festlegung 
von Emissionsreduktionen für Nationalstaaten und deren Emissionsallokationen geschaffen. 
Der vorliegende Artikel untersucht die Transformation des Markts, der zunächst von öffent-
lichen Akteuren initiiert, durch Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) angestoßen, sich zu einem 
Markt entwickelt, wo sich die Regierungen nach und nach zurückziehen und private Akteure 
immer stärker Governancefunktionen wahrnehmen. Weiterhin wird der Status quo des CDM 
evaluiert und auf verbleibende Forschungsfragen hingewiesen.
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1. Introduction
Climate change is a hot topic in various ways.	The	scientific	consensus	as	expressed	by	the	Nobel	
Peace Laureate organisation International Panel on Climate Change in its 4th Assessment Report 
explicitly states that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal as is now evident from 
observations of increases of global average air and ocean temperature, widespread melting of 
snow and ice, and rising global average sea level” (IPCC 2007). As the debate on climate change 
moves	from	the	scientific	field	to	the	realm	of	policy	and	economics,	the	question	of	how	to	
address “the biggest long-term threat facing our world” (Blair 2007) is arguably the greatest public 
policy issue of our time. In this emerging policy discussion one of the prominent questions is 
cost,	or	what	the	most	cost	efficient	ways	to	curb	emissions	are.	Economists	agree	that	climate	
change will be expensive, but ignoring it could be ruinous. A review of the economics of climate 
change, authored by the former World Bank Chief economist Sir Nicholas Stern, calls it “the 
greatest	and	widest-ranging	market	failure	ever	seen,”	but	also	identifies	that	one	of	the	solutions	
is “to create carbon prices and markets, to accelerate innovation and deployment of low-carbon 
technologies” (Stern 2006). The most important market mechanism created within the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol is the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).1
This article seeks to analyse the following aspects of the CDM:
• Is the CDM a new form of governance in climate protection? 
• If yes, how did it develop and why? 
• What were the conditions under which it evolved and what characteristics does it have 
today? 
•	 Finally,	what	consequences	regarding	efficiency	of	the	instrument	and	legitimacy	of	the	
implementing actors does the CDM as a possible new form of governance face?
While the Kyoto Protocol is clearly inadequate to reach the ultimate objective of the Framework 
Convention, avoiding dangerous climate change, it has already had an important impact. Most 
actors (state and non-state) now take climate politics seriously and are starting to take action.2 
Business,	industry	associations,	lobby	groups	and	NGOs	have	emerged	that	aim	to	influence	
1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (signed in Rio in 1992, and imple-
mented	in	24	March	1994)	sets	an	overall	framework	for	intergovernmental	efforts	to	tackle	the	chal-
lenge posed by climate change. It recognizes that the climate system is a shared resource whose stabili-
ty	can	be	affected	by	industrial	and	other	emissions	of	carbon	dioxide	and	other	greenhouse	gases.	The	
Convention	enjoys	near	universal	membership,	with	189	countries	having	ratified	it.	The	1997	Kyoto	
Protocol	shares	the	Convention’s	objective,	principles	and	institutions,	but	significantly	strengthens	
the Convention by committing 35 industrialised countries (Annex I Parties) to individual, legally-bind-
ing targets to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Developing countries (non-Annex I 
Parties)	do	not	have	such	a	legal	obligation	to	reduce	their	emissions	in	the	first	commitment	period	
2008-2012.	After	several	years	of	political	log	rolling,	the	protocol	was	finally	implemented	on	the	16th	
of	February	2005.	It	is	now	(December	2007)	ratified	by	170	parties	representing	61.6%	of	total	GHG	
emissions.
2	 In	March	2007,	the	leaders	of	the	European	Union	agreed	to	cut	EU’s	GHG	emissions	by	20%	from	
1990 levels by the year of 2020, pledging to cut emissions further if other major emitters also take ac-
tion.
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policy	making	 in	 this	 policy	field.	 Forerunners	 such	 as	 the	EU	 and	 its	member	 states	have	
developed policies trying to curb their emissions and from them policy innovations such 
as emissions trading for CO2	 and	 renewable	 energy	policies	 are	 starting	 to	diffuse	 to	 other	
countries.	The	steps	taken	so	far,	while	being	important	first	ones,	are	wholly	insufficient,	and	it	
is clear that the majority of industrialised states with Kyoto targets (so called Annex I countries) 
will	reach	their	modest	reductions	by	2012	only	if	there	is	a	dramatic	strengthening	of	efforts	
as	well	 as	 a	broad	use	of	 the	Kyoto	flexible	mechanisms.3 Therefore, the quest for the most 
effective	and	efficient	emission	reductions	has	begun.	This	has	lead	to	both	the	broader	use	of	
new	technologies	as	well	as	the	development	of	the	so-called	flexible	mechanisms	of	the	Kyoto	
Protocol. It is these mechanisms which we will focus on in this paper. 
In the Kyoto Protocol three flexible mechanisms were included. These consist of international 
emission trading (IET); the Joint Implementation (JI) project mechanism for former communist 
transition countries; and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for emission reduction 
projects based in developing countries.4 The main rationale behind these policy innovations 
was	 to	 allow	Annex	 I	 countries	 cost	 effective	 climate	 change	mitigation.	The	CDM	is	by	 far	
the	most	prominent	of	the	flexible	mechanisms,	and	we	will	thus	focus	our	analysis	on	it.	In	
2006, 522 Mt CO2e of CDM credits where traded, with additional secondary trading of 40 Mt. 
Together	these	transactions	came	at	an	estimated	value	of	€3.9	billion.	Joint	Implementation	
(JI)	reached	just	21	Mt,	€95	million	in	2006,	whereas	the	IET	has	yet	to	be	implemented	(Point	
Carbon	2007).	The	Kyoto	Protocol	has	created	the	first	internationally	traded	commodity	ever	
developed	by	 a	multilateral	 environmental	 agreement,	 certified	 emission	 reductions	 (CERs),	
and thus it seems to be of interest for policy as well as for academic debates how these CERs 
come about and what impact they have. The CDM as a market instrument is one of the most 
important building blocks in the developing carbon market, and thus we take it as our starting 
point. This is of particular interest as the governance of the mechanism has lately become a 
“hot topic” (Streck 2007).
First, we will provide a very short background of emissions trading, how the CDM works and 
why it came about (section two). Next we will examine the theoretical aspects of this development 
in environmental policy and argue that the CDM is indeed a new form of governance, although 
this cannot be said of the individual CDM projects (section three). In the following we will 
show that the CDM actually works more or less as originally conceptualized. We argue that 
it has been initiated by states and kick-started by Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) (section 
four), but that it is now evolving into a maturing market in which the aggregate of private 
actors engagement contributes to the public good of greenhouse gas reductions, albeit under 
3 Despite being seen as the trail blazers on the issue of climate change, many of the ‘old’ EU 15 member 
states are struggling to meet their GHG reduction obligation under the EU burden sharing agreement 
to	meet	the	8%	reduction	by	2012	compared	to	the	1990	baseline,	and	will	only	do	so	with	additional	
measures and through buying carbon credits such as the CDM (EEA 2006).
4	 In	the	Kyoto	Protocol	the	three	flexible	mechanisms	are	found	in	the	following	articles:	Joint	Imple-
mentation, article 6; Clean Development Mechanism, article 12; Emission Trading, article 17. The rules 
and modalities of the mechanisms were mainly negotiated in 2001 in Marrakech but have since been 
continuously further developed by the CDM Executive board and by the COP/MOP meetings.
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the “shadow of hierarchy” of public actors that still have the constitutive rule-making power 
(section	five).	Following	this,	we	will	present	a	balance	sheet	of	the	pros	and	cons	of	the	CDM	
and of the developing carbon market with the argument that overall the CDM can be judged to 
be a successful new form of governance (section six). The conclusion will elaborate on what this 
implies for research on governance in climate politics in general and for the debate about the 
CDM in particular. In brief, our paper has two arguments: First, the CDM is a new form of governance. 
Second, the form of governance has been changing from a PPP to a volatile but nevertheless functioning 
market. 
2. How Did the CDM Come About and How Does It Work? 
In the late 1980s under the Regan administration in the United States there was a growing neo-
liberal sentiment that saw inadequacies with the traditional command and control regulation 
and argued in favour of using market instruments to tackle policy problems. This notion was 
taken up in environmental policy making. For example, in the 1990 Clean Air Act such a market 
approach was taken to tackle SO2 emissions causing acid rain, a previously unregulated problem 
in	the	US.	Given	the	difference	in	abatement	costs	for	the	covered	power	plants,	this	proved	to	
be	a	much	more	cost-efficient	regulatory	approach	that	was	able	to	achieve	greater	emission	
reductions than traditional technical regulations (Stavins 1998). The idea of using a market 
approach	for	setting	up	efficient	mechanisms	was	again	included	in	the	Montreal	Protocol	on	
Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer in 1987 and then later in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. 
The CDM in particular arose out of a Brazilian proposal for a Clean Development Fund at 
negotiations in the late 1990s. The United States changed this proposal into something quite 
different.	 It	 sought	 to	 establish	 a	 protocol	 that	would	have	 as	much	flexibility	 in	 achieving	
emission reductions as possible, and one with the possibility of international emissions trading 
to	achieve	cost-effective	emission	reductions.	At	that	point	the	creation	of	emission	markets	
was considered a controversial element and was opposed throughout the Kyoto negotiations 
by environmental NGOs and also initially by developing countries, who felt that industrialised 
countries	should	first	put	their	own	houses	in	order,	and	who	feared	the	environmental	integri-
ty of the mechanism would be too hard to guarantee. Eventually, and largely on US insistence, 
CDM	and	the	two	other	flexible	mechanisms	were	written	into	the	Kyoto	Protocol.	It	is	one	of	
the great ironies of the climate regime that the concept of emissions trading later became the 
cornerstone of the EU policy to tackle climate change, despite the fact that the EU was initial-
ly quite sceptical about this approach, and that the US, who championed this approach, later 
decided to leave the Kyoto Protocol anyway. There are still critical views of the use of market 
mechanism in the climate regime (see also below), but as the concept has advanced into the 
mainstream, they are no longer as widely held (Lohmann 2006).
How	does	the	CDM	work?	As	already	mentioned,	the	CDM	is	one	of	the	flexible	mechanisms	
set up by the Kyoto Protocol to reduce GHG emissions through investments in projects that 
reduce or avoid emissions in developing countries. Figure one shows how this works in detail.
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Figure 1: The CDM Set-Up
Each CDM project is set up by a project developer who receives CERs for the amount of GHG 
avoided. The demand for CERs comes from industrialized countries that can count these 
credits towards Kyoto compliance. The 12,000 industry installations covered by the EU emission 
trading system (EU ETS) can also use CERs to account for a part of their emission reduction 
compliance within this internal EU system for CO2	reductions.	Japanese	firms	buy	CERs	to	meet	
their	voluntary	targets.	The	CDM	has	the	dual	goal	of	providing	cost-efficient	GHG	emission	
reductions	and	local	sustainable	development	benefits.	
The CDM has grown very successfully in the recent years, and its immediate future also looks 
bright.	If	85%	of	all	projects	entering	the	pipeline	until	the	end	of	2012	would	be	registered,	
and	if	the	average	issuance	success	would	stay	around	the	current	83%,	the	amount	of	CERs	
accumulated	by	the	end	of	2012	would	be	3100	Million	CERs	(for	details	up	to	2007,	see	figure	2).	
Source: Own Adoption
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Figure 2: Growth of Total Expected Accumulated 2012 CERs
All major management decisions for the CDM as a whole are made by the Executive Board 
(EB), which is the highest authority and main regulatory body of the CDM and is compromised 
of six members from non-Annex I and four members from Annex I countries. The board 
issues	CERs	after	a	successfully	completed	registration	and	verification	process.	Worth	noting	
is	 that	 of	 the	 948	projects	 approved	by	March	 2008,	 and	with	 some	 2000	more	 at	 different	
stages of validation in the pipeline, close to two thirds are renewable energy projects. However, 
of all CERs issued so far more than two thirds come from a small number of industrial gas 
destruction projects (HFCs, PFCs and N20) (Fenhann 2008). These projects earn huge numbers 
of CERs due to the great global warming potential of these gases compared to CO2, but they 
have	marginal	sustainable	development	effects.5 Nevertheless, the CDM is hailed as a success 
in creating emission reductions beyond expectations. Yet, going beyond the details, can it be 
classified	as	a	new	form	of	governance?
5 It should be noted that the market for CERs does not constitute the whole carbon market; there is also 
the	market	for	emission	certificates	from	the	EU	Emission	Trading	System	and	similar	national	or	
sub-national systems as well as a private market for voluntary emission reductions. The characteristics 
of	these	systems	differ	despite	potential	links	between	the	different	parts	of	the	carbon	markets,	such	
as the use of CERs by EU industry to meet their EU ETS compliance. In this article, unless stated oth-
erwise, when we discuss the carbon market we refer to the carbon market for CERs.
Source: UNEP Risø Centre, March 2008
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3. A New Form of Environmental Governance?
The following section will position the CDM as a policy innovation in current debates on go-
vernance. In order to qualify as a new form of governance the CDM has to have two characteris-
tics. First, it must systematically involve non-state actors and second, it must rely on non-hier-
archical forms of coordination (Risse/Lehmkuhl 2006).
Regarding the involvement of non-state actors, the governance debate acknowledged very early 
on that the relocation of authority from national entities to non-state actors was necessary to 
ensure the delivery of functions essential for human survival (Rosenau 1992). This notion has 
been taken up in recent debates on global environmental governance (Young 2001; Luterba-
cher/Sprinz 2001; Biermann/Dingwerth 2004) that all agree on a demand for policy instruments 
that go beyond the traditional state-centred approach in order to tackle emerging global envi-
ronmental problems such as climate change.
The CDM is clearly such a policy innovation where the environmental governance mechanism 
depends upon the engagement of private actors to function. The increased involvement of 
non-state actors such as businesses and NGOs can be witnessed in the policy formulation and 
implementation cycle. This is characterised by a quality of involvement distinct from previous 
self-regulations or voluntary commitments. Business actors in particular have become much 
more involved at all levels of environmental governance, not necessarily due to their insistence 
to take on this role, but also due to the voluntary “abdication” of the state in line with ideological 
ideas of less or smaller government (Esty 2002; Levy/Newell 2005). 
Going beyond the role of individual actors, as in the case of private businesses, the literature on 
public-private partnerships examines the various actors’ constellation and their implications 
for governance (Reinicke 1998; Risse/Börzel 2005). New coalitions of various actors combining 
businesses,	NGOs,	international	organisations	and	nation	states	in	different	constellations	result	
from the general demand for more integrative solutions. Individually, these actors either lack 
resources and/or capacities to tackle the problem themselves, and consequently, cross-sectoral 
alliances allow for complementing resources and expertise to collaborate in order to attain 
effective	policy	making	and	implementation.	This	implies	that	new	actors’	constellations	might	
even provide alternatives to traditional public policy with regard to ensuring the provision of 
public services such as healthy living conditions (Rosenau Vaillancourt 2000). In our case study 
below we examine the role of such PPPs in the early phase of the CDM. Our focus of analysis 
is on the changing role of public actors in setting and enforcing the constitutive and regulative 
rules of the CDM. It is evident that new actors are becoming involved, but are the emerging PPPs 
temporary arrangements to jumpstart the CDM policy process, or do they sustain themselves as 
viable long term structures?
More problematic is the question of whether new modes of non-hierarchical coordination are 
brought about by the CDM (see Benecke 2007). As the CDM is creating a market for CERs, the 
question arises as to whether a market can qualify as a form of governance. Governance in a 
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broad view includes all forms of social coordination in hierarchies, as well as in networks and 
markets	(Williamson	1985;	Powell	1990;	Coase	1991).	Governance	defined	as	such	subsumes	all	
coordination modes that constitute social order. A market instrument such as the CDM is thus 
one	of	the	possible	types	of	regulation,	besides	command-and-control	or	fiscal	measures,	which	
a public regulator can use for achieving policy goals. 
Stressing the use of the market instrument of emission trading to achieve the emission 
reduction targets of the Kyoto Protocol does not deny that to initiate the process requires the 
political	set	up	of	a	market	for	the	emission	reduction	certificates.	The	requirements	to	create	
the	market	thus	differentiate	the	market	for	CERs	from	markets	where	tangible	goods	such	as	
natural resources or commodities are traded, and which do not require political intervention 
to have any value. Politically created markets or permit markets are also found in other areas 
where	the	need	for	regulation	of	private	activities	occurs,	e.g.	quotas	for	fishing	or	licenses	for	
the operation of mobile phone frequencies in order to manage a public good (Yandle 1999). 
The actors with an interest in this form of market mechanism (in our case the nation states 
who are parties to the Kyoto Protocol) had to agree upon the rules for CDM (The Marrakech 
Accords) before the demand for CERs, the seed for the emerging carbon market, could be met 
by suppliers.
Yet, in order to attain greater analytical value and selectivity, the application of a narrow definition 
is	proposed	(Ladwig	et	al.	2007;	Göhler	et	al.	2006).	Such	a	definition	understands	governance	
as governing through non-hierarchical mechanisms involving various actors whose actions 
and interaction mechanisms are intentional, and would thus exclude market actions without 
regulative interference. The application of such a narrow governance concept is confronted by 
the assumption that hybrid forms of governance depend on the state to balance asymmetric 
constellations and require the state to more or less directly regulate society. This positions the 
state as either the central, intentional actor or demands the existence of a shadow of hierarchy 
(Héritier 2003), which is controversial in regard to the transferability of this concept outside its 
originating context, i.e. the OECD world. The second assumption contained in a more narrow 
definition	of	governance	as	“the	intentional	delivery	of	collective	goods	and	service	to	a	certain	
community” (Risse/Lehmkuhl 2006) propagates the intentionality of public service delivery as 
a prerequisite to characterising new mechanisms as governance. 
What does the adoption of this rather narrow governance concept imply for the CDM? 
Analytically speaking, the CDM encompasses a regulatory framework and an operational framework, 
and thus constitutes a multilevel mechanism. Regarding the regulatory structure, the CDM 
is comprised of the institutional set up, operational procedures of the CDM Executive Board 
(EB) as well as the basic “rules of the game”, e.g. project procedures and methodologies set 
down by the Marrakech accords by nation states. On the whole, this governance structure thus 
employs a shadow of hierarchy since it is backed up by nation states acting through the UN 
and with the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Kyoto Protocol as the ultimate decision 
making authority. The regulatory structure of the CDM can thus be described within a narrower 
governance framework.
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 10 • April 2008 |  13
If we, however, examine the operational framework, i.e. the CDM project cycle from developing 
a	CDM	project	to	selling	CERs,	different	modes	of	transactions	and	interactions	between	the	
various CDM project actors, verifying bodies, and the CDM Executive Board make up the 
“steering mechanisms” of the CDM. Dependent on the actors’ constellations, interactions can 
be	differentiated	as	either	profit	seeking	behaviour	trying	to	maximise	the	carbon	credits	from	
a project, or as public-interest related concerns to uphold the environmental integrity of the 
system. In the former we cannot speak of governance but only of business. Thus, in a narrow 
concept of governance we distinguish between carbon business and the regulation of the carbon 
business.
In	short,	the	CDM	is	a	new	form	of	governance	on	both	accounts:	in	its	systematic	inclusion	
of new actors and in its incorporation of new forms of coordination. However, the latter aspect 
has	to	be	qualified	in	the	sense	that	individual	CDM	projects	cannot	necessarily	be	described	
as a form of governance, as they simply represent part of a market mechanism. Why this is of 
importance will become clear in sections 4 and 5 where we show that the logic of the market is 
becoming more and more dominant within the CDM as a whole. 
4. From PPP…
The following two sections analyse the transition of the CDM and the emerging carbon market 
from being dominated by government-initiated PPPs to becoming a market place on which public 
and private actors engage in normal business transactions and have even become competitors. 
Knill and Lehmkuhl provide two useful categories which can be applied to describe the position 
of	the	state	in	the	initiation	phase	and	the	maintenance	phase	of	the	carbon	market:	in	the	first	
phase the state is active by intervening in the situation by intervention; in the second phase 
the situation is one of of “regulated self-regulation” with the overarching shadow of hierarchy 
(Knill/Lehmkuhl 2002).
Most	of	the	partnerships	in	the	field	of	CDM	serve	as	capacity	building	and	implementation	
networks for facilitating the development of necessary structures and institutions and for the 
implementation of projects. Nevertheless, these networks go beyond implementation if they 
use the case law mechanism set up by the Executive Board to propose new CDM methodologies 
or modify existing ones. Carbon market actors thus take a dual role in being the objects of 
the carbon market regulations, while at the same time being able to propose changes to the 
regulative rules of the market. Or, in some cases, private actors consult for developing country 
governments on how they should design their regulatory agency or “Designated National 
Authority”	(DNA)	–	the	same	body	that	the	consulting	firm	will	later	seek	project	approval	from.	
Industrialised	Annex	I	governments	possess	an	even	stronger	dual	role:	they	are	buyers	of	CERs	
on the market, while simultaneously deciding upon the rules of the market as parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol. Only purely private partnerships that represent interests and arguments of a 
single group, e.g. the International Emission Trading Association (IETA) representing industry 
or the Climate Action Network (CAN) serving as an umbrella organisation for NGOs active in 
From Public-Private Partnership to Market |  14
climate change politics, can be said to be “negotiation networks” that have as their objective the 
negotiation of global norms and standards (Witte et al. 2002). 
Partnerships in the CDM can be characterised as either public-public partnerships, such as 
capacity building measures that are initiated by e.g. Annex I countries in non-Annex I countries 
for the set up of administrative institutions for the CDM, as private-private partnerships between 
NGOs or between industries with common interests on the carbon market, or as public-private 
partnerships on the global level, such as carbon funds for private companies initiated by the 
World Bank or as public-private partnerships on the local level for the implementation of CDM 
projects	(see	figure	3).	
Figure 3: Multilayered Problem – Diverse Set of Partnerships
Legend: AI = Annex I; EB = Executive Board; NAI = Non-Annex I; IO = International Organisation; IETA = 
International Emissions Trading Association; DOE = Designated Operational Entity 
The	importance	of	PPPs	to	get	the	CDM	and	the	carbon	market	off	the	ground	is	clear.	In	the	
beginning,	inexperience	in	how	to	create	and	regulate	a	market	for	certified	emission	reduc-
tions and high technical and economic risks linked to the implementation of CDM projects 
made public and private actors act together in public-private partnerships (PPPs). In other 
words, transaction costs were too high as was the general uncertainty so that private actors were 
not ready to shoulder CDM projects on their own. With growing maturity of the market and 
many lessons learned by public and private actors alike, the PPP approach is becoming increas-
ingly dispensable.
Source: Own Adoption
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Just	as	in	many	other	policy	fields,	PPPs	are	often	formed	as	“policy	experiments”	(Rondinelli	
1983) in which participants are motivated to acquire more knowledge about regulative and op-
erational	procedures	without	expecting	monetary	benefits.	Once	a	market	has	matured	to	such	
an extent that project risks and costs become bearable for the private investor, the need to co-
operate with public actors for risk elimination becomes less, but other areas of cooperation may 
continue	such	as	information	sharing	(see	figure	4).
Figure 4: Life Cycle of Cooperation from PPP to Business Operation
The following paragraph takes the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) as an example to illustrate 
the role of a PPP on the carbon market in kick-starting business activities. The PCF began as a 
learning experiment between the World Bank, nation states and several multinational corpo-
rations (MNCs) and served as the blueprint for the set up of several other public and private 
carbon Funds.6 The PCF has been launched in cooperation with four European governments, 
Canada and Japan, and 17 private companies, bringing together 145 million US$ for the pur-
chase of GHG emission reductions via CDM and JI projects (Streck 2002). The objectives for the 
PCF	were	to	pioneer	the	flexible	mechanisms,	to	disseminate	the	lessons	learnt,	and	to	foster	
the development of the carbon market by “crowding in” the private sector through a reduction 
of operational risks and transaction costs of project activities, while contributing to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction in host countries. Its members had time to learn from both 
their partners’ and their own experiences with CDM projects, enabling them to become early 
6 Carbon Funds initiated by the World Bank include the Community Development Carbon Fund, Bio 
Carbon Fund, Netherlands CDM Facility, Netherlands European Carbon Facility, Italian Carbon Fund, 
Danish Carbon Fund, Spanish Carbon Fund, and the Umbrella Carbon Fund.
Carbon Market Evolvement
Low Project Risk
Source: Own Adoption
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movers when the carbon market became operational in 2005. For disseminating the lessons 
learnt from early CDM and JI projects, the PCF set up a website and launched the PCFPlus, a $1 
million/year facility to provide capacity building and research. A good indicator for its success 
was the closure at the end of 2006 with 25 purchase agreements signed for the removal of over 
30 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent from the atmosphere (Carbon Finance Unit at the 
World Bank 2006). 
The role of the World Bank in the management of carbon funds is however controversial. 
Researchers and practitioners criticize the Bank for overstretching its self-assigned role as 
a facilitator of the carbon market when it makes a substantial amount of money out of its 
commissions on projects (Vallette et al. 2004). Also one can argue that the World Bank is crowding 
out	 private	 investments	 profiting	 from	 its	 established	 network.	 Even	 more	 fundamentally,	
through	its	initial	strong	position	in	the	market	as	well	as	in	the	regulatory	field,	the	World	Bank	
could	be	prone	to	influence	CDM	regulation	in	its	own	interest	 (regulatory	capture).	Critics,	
furthermore,	find	the	role	of	the	World	Bank	schizophrenic,	as	it	facilitates	the	carbon	market	
while simultaneously not being willing or able to mainstream climate change considerations 
into their energy projects or country strategies (Vallette et al. 2004; Baumert et al. 2005; Seymour 
2006). On the positive side one can argue that the role of the World Bank has changed in the 
process:	 while	 its	 facilitation	 in	 the	 beginning	 focused	 on	 initiating	 CDM	 projects	 in	 any	
country of choice, the World Bank has again taken an open-door position with regards to so far 
neglected project types, e.g. launching the Bio Carbon Fund for Land-use and Land-use-change 
and forestry (LULUCF), and neglected regions like Africa.7 This example shows that PPPs are 
needed to jump-start a high risk market but should eventually be replaced by private business 
operations as the risk of engagement decreases. However, at this point in time, PPPs on the 
carbon market are still needed for broadening the reach of the CDM to poorer, less developed 
regions such as Africa or for project types with higher risks in which private actors are not 
willing to invest without public back-up. 
One of the most interesting phenomena about the CDM is that the generation of private goods 
(CERs production) by many – in the beginning through a PPP – is in its sum supposed to con-
tribute to the provision of the public good (climate protection), while some club goods (market 
regulation, local environmental protection, job creation) are provided as intended side-prod-
ucts	(see	figure	5).	The	intention	of	providing	the	public	good	of	climate	protection	has	to	be	
traced back to the inventors and rule-setters for the CDM, while the output of their intentional 
initiation of the CDM – the eventual carbon market – can hardly be described as having an in-
tention by itself. Their intention and actions have nevertheless created the structure which in 
turn impacts the behaviour of market participants, some of which are identical with the market 
creators (Annex I governments). 
7 Up to the end of 2006, the World Bank had included seven CDM projects in sub-Saharan Africa into 
its funds. For more details see Capoor et al (2006).
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Figure 5: Types of Goods Provided by PPPs 
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An indicator for the threshold between PPP and business operation is a situation in which 
private actors (e.g. carbon funds) acquire a good in competition with the PPP (e.g. World Bank 
carbon funds), indicating that the need for a PPP has diminished as risks and costs of the good 
have become bearable for private actors. As CDM projects are now set up less and less to gener-
ate club goods like capacity building or to stimulate the carbon market, but are instead prima-
rily	being	initiated	to	generate	CERs	as	a	private	good,	it	seems	justified	to	speak	of	a	function-
ing market for CERs generated through CDM partnerships.
5. …to Market?
Today, a functioning carbon market for CERs exists. This does not imply that there is no longer 
a role for regulation. Markets depend on someone setting and managing constitutive as well 
as regulative rules. That rules exist is no longer of interest, but rather those questions of who 
sets them, how, and why. As we stated above, the PPP initiated to kick-start the CDM for the 
provision of the public good of climate protection lay the foundation for the carbon market for 
CERs that turned into normal business operations with private goods (e.g. carbon fund return 
rate	and	CERs)	as	their	main	output	(see	again	figure	4	for	illustration).	However,	their	activi-
ties taken in the aggregate should – and we believe they do – contribute to the provision of the 
public good of climate protection. 
Source: Own Adoption
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What	characteristics	define	this	emerging	market?	First,	it	is	actually used not only by public entities 
but more and more by private companies. In a survey conducted by Benecke, Friberg, and Schröder 
in 2006,8 one could see that almost all interviewed companies that had to reduce emissions were 
participating	in	the	carbon	market:	out	of	the	15	European	companies,	10	companies	are	invest-
ing in their own installations, four are interested in JI projects, one company is creating its own 
CDM	project	(in	its	refinery	plant	outside	Europe)	and	12	have	chosen	to	become	engaged	in	the	
carbon	market	as	buyers	of	CERs	(Certified	Emission	Reductions).	Only	one	Austrian	and	two	
Swedish companies plan not to become active, as their “National Allocation Plan (NAP) alloca-
tion	was	sufficient,”	and	thus	they	see	no	need	for	additional	permits.	
Figure 6: Compliance Strategies
CDM stakeholders such as government bodies, NGOs and non-compliant private actors con-
firm	that	those	engaged	in	the	CDM	are	predominantly	larger	companies	mainly	in	the	power	
sector and the steel and chemicals industries with transnational outreach. Surprisingly missing 
so	far	are	smaller	and	medium	sized	companies,	as	they	are	not	affected	by	emission	reduction	
obligations	and/or	are	inexperienced	with	international	operations.	A	first	lesson	thus	is	that	if	
a	company	has	to	reduce	its	emissions,	and	CDM	projects	abroad	provide	more	cost-efficient	 
 
8 The survey consists of telephone-based and personal interviews with 36 stakeholders within the CDM 
market. The selection of interviewees was based on their perceived importance to the market. For ex-
ample, among companies with reduction obligations under the European Emission Trading System 
(EU ETS), the companies with the largest installations within their country’s National Allocation Plan 
(NAP) were approached for an interview. The interviews were conducted during August-October 2006 
either in person or via telephone using a semi-structured interview guideline. Japanese companies 
were	included	in	the	survey	despite	different	framework	conditions	due	to	their	relevance	to	the	car-
bon	market	and	in	order	to	get	a	business	perspective	from	a	different	angle.	In	favour	of	honest	and	
frank answers the interviews were conducted under the Chatham House Rule, so no attribution to 
specific	firms	will	be	made	in	this	text.
Source: Own Adoption
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ways of reducing emissions than would reductions in home installations, at least large compa-
nies will use market mechanisms like the CDM to comply with their obligations.
Second,	politics	influence	demand,	but prices influence supply. CERs have thus developed into a 
tradable commodity. Besides the volume and price of CERs generated, companies do not seem 
to have a clear preference for project types, and almost half of the interviewed companies prefer 
a	mixed	project	portfolio	(in	most	cases	via	funds)	in	order	to	keep	risks	diversified.	In	short,	
there is a market where a CER is a CER is a CER. The only exceptions are those market niches 
creating CERs that are not accepted under the EU ETS (e.g. re-forestation CERs). The market is, 
however, still highly volatile and reacts to political events, not just economic fundamentals. This 
could	be	seen	in	2006	following	the	release	of	the	first	verified	emissions	data:	the	price	for	EU	
ETS	credits	collapsed	from	over	€30/ton	to	below	€0,30/ton	as	the	extent	of	over-allocations	for	
the	first	EU	ETS	test	period	2005-2007	became	apparent.	This	clearly	diminished	the	price	com-
panies were willing to pay for CERs for this time period, even if forward prices for CERs held 
up better. Another interesting result of the survey was that although all companies interviewed 
have obligations under the EU ETS, only 8 out of 12 companies gave “compliance with the EU 
ETS” as a major reason for their engagement in CDM. 
Figure 7: Motivations for CDM
Some	companies	–	interestingly	only	refineries	–	stated	to	have	been	active	in	CDM	right	from	
the beginning in order to accumulate knowledge and to learn from early activities. Interviews 
with	other	stakeholders	confirm	that	apart	 from	making	profit	and	seizing	opportunities	 to	
explore and access new markets, the possibility of learning experiences due to an anticipated 
continuation or extension of emission trading and the CDM are key motives for companies’ 
CDM interest. Yet, one company also gave “attaining a green image” as a rationale, but this must 
not be considered a decisive factor, as NGOs rightly point out that “green image” rationales 
Source: Own Adoption
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supposedly do not play a predominant role, as this is too expensive compared to cheaper 
“green” PR alternatives. Therefore, the second lesson learned is that private businesses are 
acting strategically and are ready to shoulder up-front costs for learning or for exploring new 
business opportunities. Contrary to our preliminary expectations, the incentive of gaining 
a green image does not seem to play a role even if that seems to be the main driver in the 
unregulated,	emerging	market	for	voluntary	carbon	reductions	such	as	offsets.
Third, the market is starting to divide into a primary market that is project-related with a long-
term orientation and into a secondary market that relates to trading with options and futures on 
project-generated CERs. In 2006 transactions in the primary market totalled 522 Million tons 
(Mt) CO2e, with an additional 40 Mt in the secondary market. Together these reductions where 
worth	an	estimated	€3.9	billion	(Point	Carbon	2007).	This	secondary	segment	emerged	in	2006	
and is characterised by its short-term and fast nature, the small number of actors involved 
and thus a lack of liquidity. Interviewees describe both market segments as highly complex, 
technical	and	fluid,	which	would	allow	only	specialised	actors	to	engage	in	them.	Over	the	last	
years	market	 actors	have	 gathered	 a	 growing	 expertise	 in	financing	 and	 trading	with	CERs.	
This pertains to the emergence of new market actors, e.g. local banks, Designated Operational 
Entities (DOEs), and even leads to certain saturation in distinct segments, as well as new market 
instruments provided by banks and stock exchanges. The third lesson is thus possibly the most 
obvious	one:	whenever	profits	 can	be	made	 and	opportunities	 for	 arbitrage	 exists,	financial	
actors	try	to	profit.
Fourth, the market is still unstable and only partially mature. Characteristic features of the primary 
market, which most of the interviewees refer to, are its lack of stability due to a high number 
of entries. Generally speaking, the CDM is considered a pilot still working on a trial and error 
basis. It has shown that it works, but that it constitutes a niche rather than a mainstream 
market. A factor that contributes to certain instability apart from the infant state of the CDM 
is the emergence of the above-mentioned secondary market transactions that still lack price 
transparency. Stakeholders, to a large extent, agree on the position that the carbon market 
is somewhat uncertain since it is more policy dependent than any other market due to its 
enshrinement in the Kyoto Protocol. However, due to the uncertain political and pricing 
decisions after 2012, a growing insecurity amongst market participants is recognised. Factors 
that add to this uncertainty are fears of market distortions resulting from the EU burden 
sharing and NAP II decisions, as well as the shifting additionality criteria relating to the CDM 
projects. Particularly companies representing the buyer, i.e. demand, side in the carbon market 
agree on the characterisation of the CDM as a „jungle“ even if it is more mature now than one 
year before (Point Carbon 2007). This is because the CDM provides opportunities for successful 
early	movers	to	earn	large	profits	but	at	large	risks.	One	of	the	largest	CDM	project	developer,	
EcoSecurities	lost	47%	of	its	share	value	in	a	single	day	in	November	2007,	wiping	out	all	gains	
made	since	the	public	offering	in	October	2005	(Financial	Times	2007).	This	crash	was	due	to	a	
30%	write	down	of	projected	CER	volumes	in	the	company	project	portfolio.	The	final	lesson	
is thus that due to its high complexity, regulatory and legal issues are considered substantially 
more relevant than in other markets. Thus, there is a market, but politics rules over all.
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6. A Successful Policy?
So far we have provided a theoretical analysis of the CDM as a new form of governance, and 
we have shown that the CDM changed from being primarily a PPP to being an immature but 
nevertheless functioning market. It now seems appropriate to evaluate the CDM and to examine 
its function in policy. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the CDM and can it be judged 
to be a successful policy tool?
The	first	and	very	important	strength	of	the	CDM	is	that	it	is	fulfilling	one	of	its	primary	goals,	
which is to provide cost-efficient	emissions	reductions.	To	clarify	again:	the	CDM	mechanism	
itself does not lead to global GHG reductions; it can only provide a cheaper way to reach those 
reduction targets that Annex I countries have agreed upon. The price for CERs ranged between 
€5	and	€13/ton	at	the	end	of	2006	depending	on	the	risk	and	maturity	of	the	underlying	project	
(Point Carbon 2007). As long as CERs – reductions derived from developing countries – are cheaper 
than EU Allowances (EUAs) – reductions derived from within Annex I countries – they are of 
interest for companies and countries alike.9 This is the case even though they are accompanied 
by	higher	risks,	ranging	from	project	specific	risk	factors	to	currency	risks,	by	rejection	at	some	
stage in the CDM registration process, and by CERs delivery. Nevertheless, CDM creates an 
additional supply of credits that add to the overall amount available to companies in the EU ETS 
system, lowering the cost of compliance. Thus, some European countries like the Netherlands 
and	Spain	find	that	 the	CDM	lowers	 their	 total	cost	 for	Kyoto,	allowing	 them	to	reduce	 the	
reduction	efforts	they	need	to	impose	on	domestic	sectors.	The	European	Environment	Agency	
has	shown	that	without	using	the	flexible	mechanisms	many	of	the	old	EU	15	member	states	
could not reach their Kyoto reduction targets by 2012 (EEA 2006).
Second, from a market actor standpoint the biggest advantage of the carbon market is its high 
flexibility. As mentioned above, many of the companies interviewed regard engagement in CDM 
as an important way to hedge their carbon risk. By adding the CDM option to their compliance 
tool	 box	 they	 increase	 their	 flexibility.	The	 flexibility	 aspect	 seems	 to	 be	 a	more	 important	
motivator	 for	 some	actors	 than	 the	 lower	price	on	CERs	compared	 to	EUAs.	This	flexibility	
even	extends	over	time	as	CDM	creates	a	single	shut	off	safety	valve	for	European	compliance	
companies into the second EU ETS period 2008-2012 as they can choose to use their CERs 
either in the present or in the second commitment period, an option not available for the EUAs 
in	the	pilot	phase	(until	the	end	of	2007),	as	banking	of	EUAs	between	the	first	and	second	phase	
is	not	allowed.	This	increases	companies’	flexibility	and	reduces	their	exposure	to	EUA	price	
fluctuation	risk.
Third, the CDM has a potential role in facilitating technology transfer and increasing foreign direct 
investments into developing countries. Market participants stress that the technology has to be 
suitable to the local context, and that it is as much a matter of transferring and building up 
9 The crash of the price for EUAs in May 2006 forced some project developers, e.g. those in India, to 
reconsider	their	price	expectations	as	there	was	no	longer	a	market	for	CERs	costing	above	€20/ton.
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human capital skills and management systems as a matter of transferring technology hardware. 
For example, 2006 saw a number of large barter deals where technology providers got CERs as 
payment in return for providing technology and competence to project hosts reducing HFC-23 
or N2O adipic acid. The CDM was also important in bringing in a substantial amount of capital 
in the overall carbon market. 
Fourth, and from our perspective the most important aspect, is that the CDM is an explorative 
form of governance.	 It	 is	 explorative	 in	 various	 ways:	 i)	 it	 brings	 in	 new	 actors	 (for	 example	
American	hedge	funds	in	the	secondary	market);	ii)	it	allows	developing	countries	to	first	gain	
experiences and then to enhance local human capacity and institutions for managing and 
controlling	GHG	mitigation,	which	Streck	(2007:	92)	thus	calls	the	CDM	an	“interface”	between	
Annex I and Annex II countries; iii) it provides incentives for the development and deployment 
of new technologies and methodologies that might become important in the post-2012 climate 
regime	such	as	wind	energy,	land	fill	methane	recovery	and	energy	efficiency.	
Of course there are also serious weaknesses that have to be discussed. First, there are more 
technical issues that nevertheless have important political implications. For example, the burden 
to oversee the compliance with CDM rules is to a large extent placed on the shoulders of the 
Designated Operational Entities (DOEs). These private standardization agencies are hired by 
the project developer as external auditors of projects’ compliance with CDM rules to see if the 
project is actually reducing emissions as claimed and that it is correctly accounting for these 
reductions according to the methodology. Host governments, buyers (Annex I governments 
and companies) and project developers all have an strong interest for CDM projects with 
low baselines and a maximum generation of CERs, and DOEs are together with the CDM EB 
set to uphold the integrity of the system. Thereby, the governance function of checking and 
enforcing rules is to a large extent outsourced to private companies who are only bound by their 
accreditation by the Executive Board and by their company’s reputation. There is a pronounced 
risk that some DOEs might try to attract additional business by being too lenient or fast in their 
vetting of the projects. The governance function of controlling the operative rules of the CDM 
has thus been delegated by the Kyoto Protocol parties to DOEs, and there are calls even from 
the private sector that the Executive Board is simply not professional enough to guarantee good 
regulation.	It	acts	as	a	UN	committee	and	not	as	a	market	regulator	(Streck	2007:	98).	There	is	
also a growing competition between host countries trying to attract CDM projects, and there 
is	 a	 clear	 difference	 between	how	 thorough	host	 countries	Designated	National	Authorities	
(DNAs)	are	in	their	screening	of	projects.	Thus,	it	is	highly	questionable	if	all	actually	fulfil	the	
host countries’ own criteria.
Second, in the survey of Benecke, Friberg, and Schröder (2006) market actors strongly complained 
about the complicated and bureaucratic process of establishing CDM projects. The lengthy process of 
registration,	verification	and	approval	is	seen	as	too	slow,	arbitrary	and	developed	without	an	
understanding of how business works. Another complaint is that micromanagement of petty 
details, in particular by the Executive Board, creates a bottleneck ultimately slowing down the 
process. All this process friction drives up the transaction costs of doing CDM projects, and 
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the complexity and time lag create a high threshold for new entrants. A similar complaint is 
that	the	methodology	of	financial	additionality	is	seen	as	difficult	and	subjective	in	its	strong	
application.10 The involvement of bureaucracies is, however, no surprise, as it is through 
government	actions	that	the	market	is	set	up	in	the	first	place.	This	of	course	does	not	excuse	
the	first	indications	of	corruption	or	the	slow	down	of	individual	CDM	projects	through	bad	
governance, but these problems of abuse will most likely not endanger the whole process.
More serious is the allegation that CDMs are not contributing to sustainable development. In 
particular NGOs criticize some CDM projects for failing to contribute to local environmental 
improvements (Lohmann 2006). In some instances the CDM has even created perverse incentives 
encouraging environmentally unfriendly behaviour. For example, the ozone depleting cooling 
agent	 hydrochlorofluorocarbon	 22	 (HCFC	 22)	 should	 be	 phased	 out	 under	 the	 Montreal	
Protocol,	but	as	the	destruction	of	the	by-product	HFC	23	is	so	immensely	profitable	as	CDM	
projects, several new factories have been built despite the fact that the gas should be phased out 
(EIA 2006). Even when such perversions are stopped, the larger questions are whether CDM can 
actually	make	a	difference	at	all	in	its	current	form	as	a	small,	project-based	mechanism,	and	
whether it will be able to have a perceivable impact on the energy policy of countries which face 
very high investment needs to restructure their economics to become low carbon intensive. Of 
course it does not help that the demand for CERs is to a large part driven by EU ETS allocations, 
and policy makers here have so far failed to create a „short“ market. 
Another criticism of the CDM is the unequal regional distribution of CDM projects (shown in map 
1 below). It is highly concentrated in a few, large, relatively well-developed countries, with only 
a handful of the 547 projects approved by February 2007 located in any of the least developed 
countries (LDCs) or in Sub-Saharan Africa. If the location of the CDM remains unequally 
geographically distributed, the political support for the mechanism will increasingly come into 
question, as was evident in the discussions, and as was taken up by the UN Secretary General 
Kofi	Annan	at	the	Nairobi	COP/MOP	in	November	2006.
10 The environmental integrity of the CDM depends on the possibility of avoiding giving CERs to 
projects that would have happened anyway. Therefore all projects have to prove their financial additio-
nality;	projects	should	not	be	financed	by	official	development	aid	or	part	of	‘business	as	usual’.	This	
has proven too problematic to prove in reality. For further discussion on the concept, see Greiner 
(2003).
From Public-Private Partnership to Market |  24
Map 1: Geographical Distribution of CDM Projects
This distribution pattern of course has to do with the fact that the CDM is a market instrument 
and thus follows the logic inherent to markets. As discussed above, the majority of the carbon 
market	actors	are	profit	driven;	their	investment	decisions	for	CDM	are	guided	by	a	quest	for	
the highest return on invested capital at the lowest risk. Mirroring foreign direct investment 
patterns, they thus go where the best combination of market opportunities and stable, business 
friendly	 institutions	 are.	 This	 is	 why	 the	 CDM	 provides	 economically	 cost	 efficient	 GHG	
reductions;	the	more	they	take	other	motivations	into	account,	the	fear	is,	the	less	cost	efficient	
the mechanism will be. The EU is loath to tamper with the rule book for the CDM in order 
to address this inequality, as it would increase the political uncertainty of the CDM. Trying 
to	placate	poor	countries,	the	EU	at	the	COP/MOP	in	Nairobi	launched	the	Global	Efficiency	
and Renewable Energy Fund (GEREF) that will invest up to 100 million Euro per year in clean 
technology in developing countries. 
Finally, like all markets, the carbon market detests uncertainty. The fact that the future shape, 
form	and	very	existence	of	a	continued	climate	regime	beyond	the	first	commitment	period	
of the Kyoto Protocol ending in 2012 is uncertain is a fundamental problem, even if some 
market participants are starting to develop projects for the post-2012 horizon. Linked to the 
issue of post-2012 uncertainty is the complaint that the time horizon of the CDM is too short 
in	comparison	to	normal	business	 investment	cycles	 for	companies	considering	retrofitting	
or new investments in low carbon technologies. The problem of uncertainty has been slightly 
diminished	 by	 the	 EU’s	 commitment	 to	 reduce	GHG	 by	 20%	 (baseline	 1990)	 by	 2020	with	
promises to cut further if other major emitters do the same. This demand boost should be 
enough to keep the carbon market rolling. The question, however, is how long the EU will 
maintain a progressive line if other major emitters do not join it in the struggle against climate 
change?
Source: Own Adoption from UNFCCC and UNEP Risø Centre Information, February 2007
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The balance sheet presented above is mixed. Nevertheless, we plead for the glass being half full, 
as	one	can	clearly	see	that	the	carbon	market	is	in	existence	and	is	working	efficiently.	At	the	
same time, it is an old truth that one cannot have one’s cake and eat it too, or in our context, 
one	cannot	expect	a	market	mechanism	that	works	efficiently	to	guarantee	equity.	It	is	thus	a	
problem for politics that there are hardly any CDMs in Sub-Sahara Africa, but not a problem 
for the market, and fortunately politics is involved in the discussion of the role of the World 
Bank in setting up new carbon funds as shown above. The central question is therefore rather, 
whether the CDM will leave any local footprints that lead into the direction of sustainable 
development. It is, however, too early to tell.
7. Conclusion
In the context of this article, we have discussed the conditions of emergence, motives of actors 
and actor constellations, and the evolution of the CDM in the framework of research on 
environmental governance. Conceptualising the CDM as governance in the light of political 
science debates and contrasting these attempts with arguments for characterizing the CDM as 
a market has revealed gaps for future research.
The	CDM	as	a	market	based	solution	with	 its	 strong	 focus	on	cost	efficiency	and	flexibility	
is attractive to businesses facing reduction compliance. Despite it being ten years after 
negotiations on the rules for the CDM began, it is still in the early days for the implementation 
phase of the CDM. Most commentators seem to agree that the CDM has proven itself as a 
functioning mechanism for cost effective GHG reductions in developing countries, though less so when 
it comes to deliver sustainable development to local communities. We have shown that during 
the	evolution	of	the	CDM	towards	a	maturing	market,	the	role,	significance	and	relevance	of	
public-private partnerships has been replaced by normal business activities. Only for niche 
markets, such as in African countries, or for niche products such as CDM projects with explicit 
benefits	for	sustainable	development,	are	public-private	partnerships	still	needed	to	support	
business operations. While business actors and a new range of private secondary market actors 
have come to dominate the CDM, public actors move towards adopting new roles and functions 
oriented	 towards	 ensuring	 the	 CDM’s	 dual	 goals	 of	 cost	 efficient	 emission	 reduction	 and	
sustainable development. 
The governance function of governments did not stop with initiating and jump-starting the CDM. 
While	at	first	states	were	fundamental	in	setting	out	the	constitutive	rules	of	the	game	and	thus	
creating a carbon market, the carbon market now functions according to its own set of market 
mechanisms	albeit	under	the	shadow	of	hierarchy.	The	following	figure	illustrates	the	changing	
role	of	public	actors	on	the	carbon	market:	while	in	the	beginning	their	role	was	fundamental	
in initiating the CDM, setting up its framework conditions and steering it into the politically 
intended direction, now their role is decreasing with private actors increasingly acting as buyers 
and traders of CERs. While nation states as parties to the Kyoto Protocol are still responsible for 
the	overall	effectiveness	of	the	CDM	in	terms	of	goal	achievement,	the	control	of	compliance	
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with the regulative rules of CDM project implementation has been outsourced to private 
certification	companies	such	as	TüV	Süd	or	DNV.	Although	we	can	observe	Annex	I	countries	
also acting as CER buyers to meet their demand like any other business actor, we still need to 
acknowledge that the ultimate power to set and maintain the market framework conditions rests 
with the parties to the Kyoto Protocol, as long as the regime stays the centrepiece of governance 
efforts	to	provide	the	public	good	of	climate	protection.	
Figure 8: Evolving Forms of the Carbon Market
Future prospects and developments of the policy innovation for climate change mitigation will 
depend heavily upon the post-2012 climate change regime. With the CDM, companies have a 
broader range of emission reduction options that lowers the price of reductions even if very few 
choose to use it. For the future, market actors seem to be in broad agreement that despite the 
problems highlighted, the continuation of the CDM as a cornerstone in a future climate regime 
is increasingly taken for granted, perhaps supplemented with “brothers or sisters of the CDM” 
that expand the scope or scale of the mechanism addressing whole sectors or programmes. 
When	asked	for	practical	details	on	how	such	a	future	flexible	mechanism	would	work,	market	
participants were still fairly vague on what they envision as the better solution. This absence 
of clear ideas among stakeholders is worrisome given the limited time scope for such ideas to 
evolve	from	“straw	man“	suggestions	to	fully	fledged	proposals	ready	to	gain	wider	acceptance	
in	time	for	the	official	post-2012	climate	negotiations.
Source: Own Adoption
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It will be of interest to see to what extent the regulation of CDMs will be state-led by CDM 
host countries. In some leading CDM host countries like China, the state maintains a strong 
regulatory role in the carbon market; in other areas such as in the UK, the government is actively 
encouraging	a	strong	role	for	the	financial	markets,	including	rule	making.	The	emergence	of	
an unregulated voluntary market for carbon reductions is also a recent development that has 
substantially grown in the last year although still far from the size of the market for CERs. In the 
absence of an agreement on the future of the climate regime, many of the project developers are 
increasingly turning their attention towards this new market segment. As the pay back time for 
CDM projects up to 2012 is getting shorter and shorter, companies thus seem to think it makes 
sense to try to diversify.
Our research on the CDM as a new form of governance so far mainly focused on Annex I 
countries and on their business actors in the carbon market. As a needed complement, research 
should be conducted on the roles of public and private actors on the emerging carbon markets in the non-
Annex I countries. As indicated in the previous paragraph, some observations of these parts of the 
carbon	market	already	lead	to	the	impression	that	CDM	host	countries	differ	widely	concerning	
the role of the state in the carbon market. Thus a next step would be to examine the impacts 
of the CDM in developing countries. In this context, the success of this policy instrument 
with regard to delivering on its promises of global climate protection and on contributing 
to technology transfer and local sustainable development will depend on the extent to which 
policy	diffusion	in	a	broader	sense	has	taken	place.	This	means	that	attention	needs	to	focus	
on the constitution and evolution of local carbon markets, the impacts on local environmental 
policies	and	institutions,	and	the	effects	on	the	attitudes	and	behaviour	of	local	populations,	as	
well	as	key	stakeholders	related	to	environmental	issues	in	these	countries.	One	positive	effect	
of the CDM that is already detectable is that over the last few years there has been a substantial 
building of carbon know-how and management capacity in the principal CDM host countries, 
both among private market actors and in government. This occurred despite the fact that these 
countries do not have any commitments at this stage to reduce their emissions, and is probably 
an important precursor to further steps in the building of a global climate regime.
With regard to theory-building, future comparative research on the CDM should examine the 
effectiveness	of	this	policy	innovation	in	relation	to	other	governing	mechanisms	that	tackle	
global and local environmental problems. Ultimately, the CDM constitutes one policy option 
amongst other forms of governance in environmental politics, and its overall success depends 
not only on design and procedural issues at the international level but also on the interplay 
between local and international interests for its reception at the local levels. 
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